| RMS INSURANCE SERVICES, INC D/B/APlaintiff/Petitioner |  |  |  |
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|  | ) | Reviewing Court No: | 4-23-0143 |
|  | ) | Circuit Court No: | 2021L30 |
|  |  | Trial Judge: | Balogh |
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| SATTLER, DONALD G ET AL |  |  |  |
| Defendant/Respondent |  |  |  |

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> STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT BOONE COUNTY

RMS INSURANCE SERVICES, ) INC., an Illinois corporation d/b/a/ FLANDERS INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., and OWEN G. COSTANZA, an individual, Plaintiffs,
vs.
DONALD G. SATTLER, an individual, MARION THORNBERRY, an individual, ELISABETH M. RODGERS, an individual,

Defendants.
CASE NO. 2021-L-30
ARGUMENT

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS of the electronic
recording of the hearing before The Honorable Stephen E.
Balogh on November 10, 2022.
APPEARANCES:
MR. JOSEPH J. MADONIA, Joseph J. Madonia \& Associates,
for the Plaintiffs;
MR. TIMOTHY P. DONOHUE
Attorney at Law,
for the Plaintiffs;
MR. TRENT A. FERGUSON,
Ray A. Ferguson \& Associates, for the Defendants.

Michele A. Fitch, CSR
Official Court Reporter
Illinois License No. 084-004130
(WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were held in open court and transcribed from the digital recording system, commencing at 1:28 p.m.)

THE COURT: We're here for argument on the combined motion to dismiss in RMS Insurance Services and Owen Constanza versus Donald Sattler, Marion Thornberry and Elisabeth Rodgers.

Before we get going, could we have counsel introduce themselves and tell us who they're here with.

MR. DONOHUE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Timothy P. Donohue on behalf of the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Hello, Counsel.
MR. MADONIA: Joseph J. Madonia, Judge, on behalf of plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Hello.
MR. MADONIA: Hi, Judge.
MR. FERGUSON: Good afternoon, Judge. Trent Ferguson on behalf of the defendants. All defendants are present.

THE COURT: All right. And it appears that the plaintiff is also present.

MR. DONOHUE: Yes, he is, Your Honor. I'm sorry.
THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, I will tell you
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that I have read all of the briefs, read all of the cases associated with both of your memoranda and I think I have a pretty good handle on the facts and the arguments, and the reason I'm sharing that with you is rather than just have the parties regurgitate what they've done in their motions --

I guess since it's your motion, Mr. Ferguson, I'd like to have you make any brief statement you'd like to make and then I might start interrupting you with questions, and then before we're done, I'll hear from plaintiffs' counsel.

Is just one of you going to speak or do you both plan to --

MR. DONOHUE: I think probably I'll do most, if not all, of the speaking, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. And this is -- essentially we're set for argument. I want to make sure I understand everything before I make a decision on the motion because you don't always get -- you know, I find that I don't always get things right just by reading the briefs.

So with that, Mr. Ferguson.
MR. FERGUSON: Thank you, Judge. There's two pending motions, a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. Does the Court have a preference on which

THE COURT: The motion to dismiss -- let's focus more on the motion for summary judgment because it's -- takes care of the whole complaint if I find in your favor.

MR. FERGUSON: That's my understanding, Your Honor. So the motion for summary judgment is based on the fact of -- or the theory of substantial truth, as the Court's aware. We were previously here on a SLAPP motion, which is a newer act in Illinois, and that was a motion to dismiss and at that time, as the Court's aware, the Court, then Judge Barch, decided that the majority -just over the majority of the allegations -- specific allegations in the political flyer were true; however, he didn't -- he stated in his ruling that the other ones may be substantially true but that's an affirmative defense so now we're here coming back today saying, well, they are substantially true. The test, of course, as the Court is aware, is whether or not the gist or the sting is true, not the real facts that go with it.

THE COURT: Well -- and let me ask you something. Judge Barch in his ruling talked about -- essentially read in the context of the whole this is somehow defamatory or could be construed by a jury as being defamatory. How does that change in the con- -- in the
construct of a motion for summary judgment?
MR. FERGUSON: Well, again, that was a motion to dismiss so we had to find that everything was true under the -- or not meritless or basically true under the SLAPP --

THE COURT: That it was absolutely meritless.
MR. FERGUSON: Correct.
THE COURT: I understand that, but bottom line is if it's substantially true, isn't it meritless?

MR. FERGUSON: No. It's a different test. The standard, of course, for a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss are different.

THE COURT: There can't be any issue of fact.
MR. FERGUSON: Correct, correct, and the standard is again not if it's -- not if it's true, if it's substantially true, and that's what the Court didn't decide, whether the gist or the sting --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FERGUSON: -- is correct. And again, I've provided in the motion plenty of case law that gives examples. One is there is substantial truth to the statement that somebody was convicted of domestic battery when, in fact, it was just a simple battery that was later expunged. Substantially true. It's whether the
sting or the hurt holds true so that's what we didn't rule on.

So the remaining allegations -- there are six of them plus the overall characterization of the criminal record. I can go through those.

THE COURT: Yeah. Where did that come from?
MR. FERGUSON: They always talked about last argument --

THE COURT: I know, but I --
MR. FERGUSON: -- from the plaintiffs' counsel --
THE COURT: And that's maybe a question I'll address to you but --

Go ahead.
MR. FERGUSON: I don't know if the Court wants me to go -- they've seen the reports.

THE COURT: I will -- I will -- I think that's one that's better for the plaintiffs because you're right. Judge Barch talked about -- and the plaintiffs talked about in their brief quite a bit about the fact that he was -- that Mr. Costanza has never been criminally convicted of anything having to do with fraud and especially as regard to -- in regard to insurance fraud; right?

MR. FERGUSON: Correct. The insurance fraud is a
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separate issue outside the overall criminal.
THE COURT: But there's no allegation that he has been, is there?

MR. FERGUSON: There's not.
THE COURT: Nobody has ever said he was, have they?
MR. FERGUSON: That's our position. Every statement is carefully worded and 100 percent absolutely true, is backed up by official state documents, by court documents and by admissions of the plaintiff, some of which overlap, and we have multiple uncontested evidence of each statement.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you a couple of context questions. At the time the flyer was disseminated, at the time that the blog, which basically repeated the allegations of the flyer, was online, at the time that this was going on, the public dissemination of the allegations at the heart of this, wasn't there an ongoing election for village president -- well, there was an election for probably more than just village president, but wasn't one of the defendants running for village president and Mr. Costanza was the incumbent?

MR. FERGUSON: Correct. Defendant Sattler was running against Mr. Costanza and ultimately Mr. Sattler won, which is I think why we're here.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't know if it makes a difference, but one of the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint is that -- Mr. Sattler or Stattler?

MR. FERGUSON: Sattler.
THE COURT: Sattler. Thank you. Mr. Sattler was at the time prior to the election but he was on the village zoning board.

MR. FERGUSON: Correct.
THE COURT: And was apparently asked to resign or be fired.

MR. FERGUSON: That's my understanding.
THE COURT: All right. Does it matter -- do I need to know why he was asked to resign? Does it make any difference at all?

MR. FERGUSON: None in my opinion, none at all.
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Because I don't and it's -there's -- all right. So your defense is, you know, you've got to prove that the statement was made, that it was false, and that at the time it was made, the individual publishing the statement knew it to be false, and at least in the context of his business or his ability to do business, is that not per se defamation?

MR. FERGUSON: Per se defamation I think is a different category where it's specific allegations --

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THE COURT: Well, if it impugns somebody's ability to conduct their profession or business.

MR. FERGUSON: Correct.
THE COURT: That's a category of per se defamation.
MR. FERGUSON: And then we get back to the defense, of course --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. FERGUSON: -- is whether --
THE COURT: And truth is always a defense. And essentially you're saying that there is no way that this could be read as being false?

MR. FERGUSON: Correct.
THE COURT: All right. I got it.
Go. Counsel, do you --
MR. DONOHUE: Oh, for me?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. DONOHUE: Well, our position is that this motion for summary judgment is just repeating their reply to the SLAPP motion.

THE COURT: So what?
MR. DONOHUE: Well, there's been -- in the SLAPP motion, there's a finding of record that --

THE COURT: So what? I'm not bound by that.
MR. DONOHUE: Well, there are found that there's
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genuine issues here and this last motion --
THE COURT: No. They found that your suit wasn't meritless.

MR. DONOHUE: And they found that there was questions on the defamation that needed to go to the jury.

THE COURT: And what were those questions?
MR. DONOHUE: The specific -- that we set out in our response.

THE COURT: Well, I read your brief and that's this idea that it could be construed as false when taken on the whole.

MR. DONOHUE: Right. And it's construed as false after --

THE COURT: How can it be construed as false?
MR. DONOHUE: Well, the entire flyer, if you will, has highlights on it in big bold on the corners that say "Insurance fraud" and the bottom says, you know, stop Mr. Costanza from defrauding our community.

THE COURT: Okay. "We cannot allow a repeat criminal like Mr . Costanza to defraud our village like he has defrauded his creditors, customers, past employers and the Wisconsin, Indiana and Illinois Department of Insurance. What else has he done to us." Is that what you're referring to?

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MR. DONOHUE: Yeah. That's the gist of that flyer.
THE COURT: Well, and that's the -- kind of the closing statement.

MR. DONOHUE: It's also -- it's also highlighted in the corners "Insurance fraud." Insurance fraud is a felony.

THE COURT: Well, it's also a civil problem. There's a civil action for fraud. The regulatory departments treat it administratively.

MR. DONOHUE: And I don't think that the general public can make that decision based on that flyer.

THE COURT: So what?
MR. DONOHUE: Well, they're saying that "My opponent's criminal record is," and he's committed insurance fraud.

THE COURT: They never say that. I got the flyer right here in front of me.

MR. DONOHUE: "My opponent's criminal record is."
THE COURT: A repeat criminal like Mr. Costanza to defraud our village like he has -- well, he -- I mean, as a matter of truth, doesn't he have one plea of guilty and two convictions in the criminal context?

MR. DONOHUE: On misdemeanors that were both over ten years old.

THE COURT: So?
MR. DONOHUE: They're not admissible.
THE COURT: They're not admissible but they're not false.

MR. DONOHUE: And they're not -- they're painting him as a career criminal. One of those is a DUI.

THE COURT: So what?
MR. DONOHUE: That tens of thousands of people in this state --

THE COURT: But they're true. How does that make them defamatory?

MR. DONOHUE: But the other ones were found not to be true.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, does it make a difference --
MR. DONOHUE: The majority --
THE COURT: Does it make a difference in the context that he was running for village president and that this all concerned a matter of public interest?

MR. DONOHUE: No, it doesn't because that was adjudicated on their SLAPP motion.

THE COURT: What?
MR. DONOHUE: That was adjudicated on the SLAPP motion.

THE COURT: I don't even understand what you're
talking about.
MR. DONOHUE: Okay. Well, they filed a motion to dismiss under 2-619 --

THE COURT: All right. Correct me if I'm wrong, but neither party has raised this as far as I can tell. I know Judge Barch didn't raise it. But in the context of the law of defamation, right, if it concerns either a party of a matter of public interest or a public person, then there is a heightened standard.

MR. DONOHUE: And we did argue that and it's in the transcripts from the hearing.

THE COURT: The matter of privilege?
MR. DONOHUE: The matter -- privilege never came up and the matter of -- the defendants never argued that they had a privilege.

THE COURT: No, they haven't, but you still have to -- you know --

MR. DONOHUE: We got to Mr. Costanza being a public figure. We covered --

THE COURT: And Judge Barch said he absolutely is a public figure.

MR. DONOHUE: He did and we argued the actual malice and the reckless disregard for the truth.

THE COURT: Where -- okay.
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MR. DONOHUE: It's in this -- it is in the transcript --

THE COURT: Show me -- tell me one single untrue statement.

MR. DONOHUE: Can I have the flyer, Joe?
All right. Well, the two huge Xs that say "Insurance fraud" are not true.

THE COURT: He was administratively found to have committed fraud by the Wisconsin Department of Insurance, by the Illinois Department of Insurance, and he in each case affirmatively responded in applications for producer's licenses that he had no criminal convictions and that he had no prior discipline.

MR. DONOHUE: Right. And in his affidavit we went through that and we discussed it with the Court that those were mistakes in a computer application --

THE COURT: Well, I -- apparently those departments of insurance felt differently because one of them refused to issue a license for 30 days. One of them fined him for $\$ 1500$ and one of them suspended his business's license permanently and fined his business \$30,000.

MR. DONOHUE: And we can go through every issue of that. That involved a partner of his business that was stealing money from the business and it was litigated in

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the circuit --

THE COURT: There is -- I went through those records, which were all produced by FOIA, and there is nothing -or pursuant to FOIA request -- and there is nothing in there except for the department's findings that Mr. Costanza provided fraudulent information to those departments, and the Department of Insurance in Illinois got him for repeated instances of fraud and misrepresentation and misuse of funds.

MR. DONOHUE: And again, that was a partner that was litigated in the Circuit Court of Cook County that was stealing --

THE COURT: But he's the licensed producer, and if he is the sole member of the propriety interest, isn't he responsible for those things? Why else would they fine him in the course -- in the course of the LLC? Why else would they fine him $\$ 30,000$ ? They didn't fine his partner $\$ 30,000$.

MR. DONOHUE: Well, I wasn't at that so I don't know, but I do know that there were allegations that his partner was the one stealing the money and I'm not sure, but I believe --

THE COURT: Why is it not his fault that when asked if he had ever had a criminal conviction or had ever had
prior discipline, that he affirmatively answered no on those applications?

MR. DONOHUE: Because on the Wisconsin application, it was a new form on the computer rather than a handwritten one and he made a mistake and he let Wisconsin know that he made a mistake and they held his license for 30 days while they cleared it up.

THE COURT: That isn't -- that isn't what they -they said that we are going to hold it for 31 days I think it was because of the misrepresentation.

MR. DONOHUE: Right, but the misrepresentation was found to be de minimis because it was a mistake on clicking a box on a computer.

THE COURT: What about Indiana? They did the same thing. They said we're not -- not only are we not going to give you a producer's license, we're going to fine you \$1500.

MR. DONOHUE: Again, I believe it was the same situation. These were not intentional. Fraud has to be intentional, Your Honor. We both know that. You know, if there's a mistake made on an application, usually it gets corrected and there's usually information that says to the best of my knowledge and belief.

THE COURT: Let's go down this one at a time because

I think I'm missing something.
1995, pleads guilty to filing a false report in Boone County. True or correct?

MR. DONOHUE: That's true.
THE COURT: True or false?
MR. DONOHUE: That's true.
THE COURT: 1999, terminated from Liberty -- and there's a mistake here. It should say Liberty Mutual Insurance for fraud misrepresentation.

MR. DONOHUE: I believe that's false.
THE COURT: And how do you believe that's false knowing that the records have been produced in this -- in this case?

MR. DONOHUE: I believe on this case with Liberty Mutual there was a claim made, there was an investigation and they found that it was not fraudulent and they gave him his severance and his retirement, if I'm correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, Counsel, I read through the record and it says in the record -- and I'm paraphrasing -- that Liberty Mutual Insurance, the company, filed an administrative complaint with the Wisconsin Department of Insurance accusing him of fraud and misrepresentation and that it, therefore, terminated his employment for cause. That's what Liberty Mutual
did.
MR. DONOHUE: That's what they did. They filed something accusing him. The ultimate finding was no fraud.

THE COURT: And he was terminated because of that reported fraud --

MR. DONOHUE: Because of that accusation, which was later found to be not fraud. You're basing it on an accusation, Judge.

THE COURT: No. In 1999 Costanza was terminated by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company for fraud and misrepresentation.

MR. DONOHUE: He was accused of fraud and misrepresentation.

THE COURT: Mr. -- I'm parsing here. The statement says that Liberty Mutual fired him for fraud and misrepresentation. Is that untrue?

MR. DONOHUE: I believe it is. I believe that he was accused of it.

THE COURT: Why did Liberty Mutual fire him?
MR. DONOHUE: I don't know.
THE COURT: For fraud and misrepresentation. That's what they told the Wisconsin Department of Insurance.

MR. DONOHUE: But this is only half of the story.
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THE COURT: It doesn't matter.
MR. DONOHUE: Yes, it does, Judge.
THE COURT: The statement -- the statement is verifiably true.

MR. DONOHUE: So is the fact that he was found not to have committed fraud after the investigation, which negates that statement.

THE COURT: Okay. In 1999 Costanza pled guilty to writing bad checks. True or false?

MR. DONOHUE: That's true.
THE COURT: In 2000 Costanza suffered a home foreclosure in Boone County, Illinois.

MR. DONOHUE: It's true.
THE COURT: All right. In 2000 Costanza completed a bankruptcy filing.

MR. DONOHUE: That's true.
THE COURT: In 2007 Costanza pled guilty to drunk driving.

MR. DONOHUE: That's true.
THE COURT: In 2008 the State of Wisconsin denies Costanza's request for an insurance license due to a false application.

MR. DONOHUE: That's true and we discussed it.
THE COURT: Right. 31 days. Correct?

MR. DONOHUE: Again, yes, but he got his license so it wasn't denied. It was held.

THE COURT: Right, for -- but it was denied.
MR. DONOHUE: But this says denied, meaning he never got his license to the general public. We're talking about the general public.

THE COURT: In 2010 the State of Indiana fined Costanza for a false application and revoked his insurance license.

MR. DONOHUE: Did they revoke his license or did they revoke RMS's license?

THE COURT: It was denied. He was not allowed to have an insurance license. That was an application for an insurance license so they just said you can't have one.

MR. DONOHUE: I don't believe that that's true.
THE COURT: So the word revoked is incorrect. Your client wants to tell you something.

MR. DONOHUE: Excuse me. (Brief pause.)

MR. DONOHUE: He's telling me, Judge, that his license was issued. It was not revoked.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, the records in the file indicate that he was fined $\$ 1500$ and that that
application was denied. The order of discipline -- the $\$ 1500$ fine was entered by consent.

MR. DONOHUE: And he still got his license.
THE COURT: Later.
MR. DONOHUE: So basically it's a traffic ticket.
THE COURT: Okay. And then there are three all concerning an Illinois Department of Insurance investigation.

MR. DONOHUE: That stems from the litigation with his former partner in Cook County.

THE COURT: And in 2015 -- this is the state -- this is the one that matters. In 2015 the Illinois Department of Insurance disciplined and fined Costanza $\$ 30,000$ for multiple repeat violations. Is that true?

MR. DONOHUE: He was fined, yes.
THE COURT: For multiple repeat violations?
MR. DONOHUE: Right.
THE COURT: All right. And then there's that statement we already read, which I think your argument is that it's -- creates the impression that he has been criminally convicted of fraud.

MR. DONOHUE: Yeah, especially when you read the entire flyer in context and the very first words on it are "My opponent's criminal record is."

THE COURT: Where does it say "My opponent's criminal record" --

MR. DONOHUE: May I approach? Judge, may I approach the bench?

THE COURT: Hold on. I've got it right here. Where does it say "My opponent's criminal record" --

MR. DONOHUE: May I approach the bench?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. DONOHUE: Here, Judge. This is the flyer. (Tenders document.)

THE COURT: I'm looking.
MR. DONOHUE: Right there.
THE COURT: Oh, yeah. "My opponent's criminal record is." Okay. And that's where we get this idea that the context that a lot of this isn't criminal.

MR. DONOHUE: Correct. This is the headline. This is the headline and the gist -- the meaning of this document is Owen is a criminal who has committed insurance fraud and defrauded the people of Poplar Grove. There's no evidence here that he's defrauded anyone in Poplar Grove. This is --

THE COURT: It doesn't say that he has. It says we can't give him the chance to defraud us like he has defrauded --

MR. DONOHUE: We cannot allow him to defraud our village.

THE COURT: Like he has defrauded his creditors, customers, past employers and all of these insurance departments.

MR. DONOHUE: And since we're not required to prove our case at the pleadings -- or at the summary judgment stage and the only thing we're here for today is to determine, $A$, on a motion for summary judgment only whether there's a genuine issue of material --

THE COURT: There is no genuine issue that I can see. I'm telling you and -- and this is -- he didn't raise it. You didn't raise it. Judge Barch didn't raise it. This is an election. In this case there is a First Amendment privilege.

MR. DONOHUE: I would -- I respectfully disagree with you that we didn't raise it.

THE COURT: I am telling you that they raised the fact that he was a public person.

MR. DONOHUE: And I raised the fact --
THE COURT: But the standard for defamation in this case is that it not only has to be false, it has to have been published maliciously. Not only knowing that it was false but knowing that it would cause damage, knowing --

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it has to be reckless disregard for the truth.
MR. DONOHUE: And I argued that in the hearing. THE COURT: Where is there reckless disregard for the truth here?

MR. DONOHUE: Again, we're going back to the substantial truth argument. The gist of this flyer -THE COURT: If it's substantially true, it can't be reckless disregard for the truth.

MR. DONOHUE: It's not substantially true. This is saying that he is -- got a criminal record and a career criminal.

THE COURT: He does -- it does not say career criminal. It doesn't even apply that. It says he has a criminal record, which is true.

MR. DONOHUE: Repeat criminal.
THE COURT: Which is true.
MR. DONOHUE: Which is true on a DUI. They're elevating something like a DUI --

THE COURT: Aren't you parsing?
MR. DONOHUE: Yes, I'm parsing.
THE COURT: Well, you can't do that in a defamation case.

MR. DONOHUE: Yes, I can. There are more than one allegation about him.

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THE COURT: Give me one that's false.
MR. DONOHUE: All right.
THE COURT: Give me one that's false. Give me one that could be --

MR. DONOHUE: These are not criminal. This whole -THE COURT: That doesn't -- no. I said give me one that is false, one allegation on here that is out and out false, untrue.

MR. DONOHUE: Wisconsin did not deny his license.
THE COURT: They did.
MR. DONOHUE: No. They held it while they investigated it.

THE COURT: No. They said he was denied for 31 days.
MR. DONOHUE: 31 days is not a denial. A denial in the text of this message is that he didn't get his license. There's nothing in there that explains --

THE COURT: Counsel, I got to be -- I got to be honest with you. I don't know these people. I don't live in Poplar Grove. This is an election.

MR. DONOHUE: I understand that.
THE COURT: And one of the parties is posting something on the internet, publishing something that is, in fact, verifiably substantially true. The guy is running to be the village president, which is a fiduciary
position, a position of trust, and the defendants are saying he's not worthy of your trust. I can't think of any more privileged speech. It's got to be untrue, and to say, well, it's not a criminal conviction, it's an administrative finding --

MR. DONOHUE: Because they wrapped it under the umbrella of all of this is criminal. I didn't produce this. Mr. Sattler produced this, and it says "My opponent's criminal record is."

THE COURT: Do you think -- do you think that any reasonable person would construe that every allegation made in there is criminal, especially when it says something like he was fired by Liberty Mutual?

MR. DONOHUE: For fraud.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. DONOHUE: Yes, I would.
THE COURT: There's nothing in there that says he was ever criminally convicted of fraud.

MR. DONOHUE: Then why is it underneath this "My opponent's criminal record is"?

THE COURT: Because you want to wrap it all in that --

MR. DONOHUE: I didn't do this.
THE COURT: No. I mean you as an advocate want to
wrap it all in that blanket.
MR. DONOHUE: Absolutely because the blanket is right here in front of my face.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have anything better than that that I can hang my hat on?

MR. MADONIA: Well, Judge, if I could say that this was carefully considered. It was parsed and it was evaluated, each individual claim, by Judge Barch.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. MADONIA: And he specifically said with each of these claims --

THE COURT: I'm not bound by what Judge Barch said.
MR. MADONIA: I understand, Judge, but again, for example, the paperwork attached does not support the assertions that Costanza filed a fraudulent license renewal application. It does not appear that he ever filed a fraudulent insurance renewal application with the Illinois Department of Insurance. And what he says is the gist of this and what the case law says each of these isolated instances may or may not be true. The fact of the matter is is when you hand out a flyer to -- 5,000 flyers to 5,000 people and you do it after the election -- when the election is done and gone, you still continue to disseminate it everywhere.

THE COURT: Wasn't this started during the election? MR. MADONIA: It was started during the -- well, Judge, the dispute started far before that.

THE COURT: There's no allegation in here that this was -- that this continued after the fact.

MR. DONOHUE: It's in the complaint, Judge.
MR. MADONIA: With respect, Judge, there are allegations absolutely and that's part of the case.

THE COURT: In what regard?
MR. MADONIA: If I can answer --
MR. DONOHUE: There's an allegation in Mr. Costanza's complaint that as late as February 2022 Mr . Sattler was showed this -- this --

THE COURT: Okay. Somebody else showed it to him.
MR. DONOHUE: No. Mr. Sattler --
THE COURT: Showed the flyer.
MR. DONOHUE: Showed it to a state representative and that state representative is available to testify.

THE COURT: How did that harm him?
MR. MADONIA: If I could finish and state, Judge, to conclude my statement. This clearly -- and again, this is not going to lawyers. This is going to members of the community which are not lawyers.

THE COURT: It sure is.
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MR. MADONIA: And as the judge said, when you look at the totality of this flyer -- in the context of the flyer, "My opponent's criminal record is," including with that limitation civil and criminal -- this does not say that. It says "My opponent's criminal record is" and it enumerates all of these things that are crimes. They're not crimes, Judge. And right there -- that in and of itself -- the judge said to look at this as a whole, there are questions of fact. He concluded his opinion --

THE COURT: Give me a question of fact.
MR. MADONIA: The question of fact right there is he was not -- well, Judge, you're saying that the denial for 30 days, which would be a suspension, is a denial. That's not a denial.

THE COURT: It's not a suspension because there's no license to suspend.

MR. MADONIA: Well, that's a question of material fact.

THE COURT: And what difference does it make?
MR. MADONIA: Well, the balance of the statements -as Judge Barch said, the balance of the statements whether they're intended to be false, misleading, defamatory, injurious to the plaintiff are questions of fact for the jury.

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THE COURT: Isn't the fact that his license was held up because he submitted a false -- and I'm not asking about intent so don't fight with me. Because he submitted a false application for a producer's license. He submitted an application on which he had checked -affirmatively checked, not just left blank, no, I have never had a criminal conviction; no, I have never been disciplined by any other insurance agency.

MR. MADONIA: No, Judge, it was not, and it was never determined to have been false. We're making that assumption looking at that based on what they're saying, but the earlier judge and anybody else looking at that can say --

THE COURT: Wait a second. Those documents that are electronic applications in the file here. You can see that he checked no. He submitted it pursuant to a FOIA request. Am I wrong?

MR. FERGUSON: I believe you're right and there's -the State of Wisconsin uses the word denied and Owen Costanza himself in a letter to Montana says denied.

THE COURT: Denied. And the electronic -- there's one electronic application and the box is checked no.

MR. MADONIA: Yes, Judge, and the judge says -- the earlier judge says Wisconsin insurance license was not

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permanently or --
THE COURT: It was not permanently denied. I do not -- I do not --

MR. MADONIA: Another question --
THE COURT: But I'm saying that you're taking the word denied and saying that's the important word. Well, isn't the important word that he misrepresented to the Wisconsin Department of Insurance?

MR. MADONIA: That's not what this says, Judge, and in addition, my opponent's criminal record is a home foreclosure.

THE COURT: No. I don't think you understood the question. It says Wisconsin denies insurance license for false application, and as I read that, the important allegation of that sentence is false application. Right?

MR. MADONIA: Well, I would argue no, Judge, and I would also argue that there is no finding anywhere of insurance fraud. There's none. That's the whole gist of this. My -- if we want to look at the big red print and the primacy/recency effect if it came down to experts analyzing the first and last thing they see, "My opponent's criminal record is," right there that red X , "Insurance fraud." We cannot allow a repeat criminal to continue. He was never included -- never convicted of

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insurance fraud. There's a question of fact right there. The other question of fact is whether a home foreclosure is a criminal record, whether the bankruptcy is a criminal record. It's not --

THE COURT: Who would -- who would possibly read a home foreclosure to be criminal?

MR. MADONIA: The client -- the client --
MR. DONOHUE: Mr. Sattler.
MR. MADONIA: The client who called him and said we understand you were convicted of insurance fraud so we're discontinuing our relationship with you.

THE COURT: Who called him and said that?
MR. DONOHUE: Family Dental. It's in the complaint. In the allegations in the complaint.

THE COURT: But they didn't -- but he was -- he had -- he was disciplined for insurance fraud.

MR. MADONIA: He was not convicted ever of insurance fraud.

THE COURT: I didn't say convicted. I said disciplined.

MR. DONOHUE: But again, under the totality of this, the headline is "My opponent's criminal record is." This is saying Owen Costanza is a criminal.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.
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MR. DONOHUE: And that's what Mr. Sattler intended.
MR. MADONIA: And, Judge, I think the important point to say, too, is this continued well after the election, and while that was going on, Mr. Costanza did nothing to curtail his speech. He did nothing to stop it as the judge very carefully analyzed when they threw out that SLAPP motion.

THE COURT: Who? Mr. Costanza didn't?
MR. MADONIA: Mr. Costanza never took any action during the course of the election, and after he lost the election, he didn't take action until his --

THE COURT: What kind of action?
MR. MADONIA: The lawsuit. Until his business started dwindling away, until people started affirmatively telling him we hear you're a criminal, we hear you've been convicted of insurance fraud.

THE COURT: Well, and that makes me -- and that makes me wonder why if this stuff was all false he didn't say something about it at the time?

MR. MADONIA: Because he respected the right of freedom of speech. He respected the election. He let them say what they were going to say and let bygones be bygones after the election. They didn't do that, Judge. They won the election and they continued to try to drive
him down. They said in their affidavits it is our intent to interfere with him in their affidavits. They didn't respond to the motion --

THE COURT: Interfere with him in what regard?
MR. DONOHUE: With his career in local politics.
THE COURT: With his career in local politics.
MR. DONOHUE: Right.
THE COURT: That's not as an insurance agent.
MR. DONOHUE: Except that in this community the two are irretrievably intertwined.

THE COURT: I know. I get it. I get it. I get it.
MR. DONOHUE: And the allegations in the affidavit were in the present tense, Judge.

THE COURT: Well -- and there's an allegation -- and that's something else I wanted to -- there's allegations, for example, that -- and the one specific example that's given is that they interfered with the prospective business advantage by destroying relationships with potential customers and then it says specifically -- I think it's the North Boone School District.

MR. DONOHUE: Correct.
THE COURT: All right. But there's no -- but there's no allegation of any expectation in a future relationship with the school district. In other words, it just says

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they stopped returning my calls.
MR. DONOHUE: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay. But did he have any kind of -- a reasonable expectation that they were going to --

MR. DONOHUE: I believe he did.
THE COURT: How so? That's not alleged.
MR. DONOHUE: It was in his affidavit.
THE COURT: No.
MR. DONOHUE: Yes, it was, Judge.
THE COURT: No. It says that he had made calls to them and they stopped returning his calls.

MR. DONOHUE: Right. If you look at the report that Mr. Ferguson attached to the motion, it says that they only considered two so he had a 50/50 chance at worst and he was being told that, you know, we're just -- we're looking at it and then he was not notified of the meeting to make a presentation and this was in time relation we believe with Mrs. Rodgers' FOIA request --

THE COURT: Did anybody from the school district ever say, you know, we plan on making this deal with you?

MR. DONOHUE: I don't know. You'd have to ask Mr. Costanza.

THE COURT: Counsel, tell me about that.
MR. FERGUSON: About the school district?

THE COURT: This reasonable expectation.
MR. FERGUSON: There isn't one. I mean, it's just as simple as that. I believe -- and I missed the part where I said it was down to two -- I said that? I think there was nine applicants and I believe the school board went with the person they were going with before. This is all kind of technical. The school board said, well, this is a different type of insurance that we haven't done before.

THE COURT: It doesn't matter.
MR. FERGUSON: It doesn't even -- even if you had a contract --

THE COURT: But the point is did he ever -- you know, was he ever told by the school board that you're -- you know, you're one of two or three finalists for this?

MR. FERGUSON: No, and even if he was, it still doesn't have --

THE COURT: I understand. I understand. Because there's no expectation that he's got the contract.

MR. FERGUSON: Right. My understanding is there was no conversations that he was.

THE COURT: And that goes back to your motion to dismiss those three counts.

Counsel, you know, I'm going to be honest with
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you -- and I can read your frustration, but I'm not persuaded that there is any -- as a matter of law any defamation here. You know, there's nothing to go to a jury.

MR. DONOHUE: What about the findings that the statements impugn his character to conduct business, the statements --

THE COURT: If they're true --
$\operatorname{MR}$. DONOHUE: But this is -- these are not overall true.

THE COURT: They are -- each one of those statements is verifiably true.

MR. DONOHUE: Verifiably true in a matter of law, not in a matter of, hey, this is on the laundromat in Poplar Grove --

THE COURT: But that's the standard for malicious --
MR. DONOHUE: No. It's reckless disregard for the truth.

THE COURT: Malicious --
MR. DONOHUE: These are half truths.
THE COURT: Malicious defamation is what needs to be --

MR. DONOHUE: There's no such thing -(Simultaneous speaking.)

THE COURT: -- shown by the plaintiff if it is --
MR. DONOHUE: It's not malicious --
THE COURT: You know, you're -- now you're interrupting me.

MR. DONOHUE: I'm sorry.
THE COURT: Malicious defamation is what you have to show as the plaintiff if this is speech concerning a public person and/or a matter of public interest and malicious defamation may be shown by demonstrating reckless disregard for the truth. There are several ways whether you can see or test whether there is reckless disregard for the truth and if -- let me see if I can find in my notes.

Here we go. Do the statements have a precise and readily understood meaning. Are the statements objectively verifiable and whether the statements' social context signals that it has factual content. All right? That last one goes to this idea of is it an opinion. Does the social context -- okay. I think in this context, the social context is it's in the midst of an election and it pretty much was intended to demonstrate factual content. Right?

MR. DONOHUE: Again, yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And the statements are each
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objectively verifiable. Is that not true?
MR. DONOHUE: I don't think so.
MR. MADONIA: Judge, I would argue that, no,
absolutely not as the other judge said.
THE COURT: How are they not?
MR. MADONIA: Because what they say, Judge, is they say half truths and innuendoes that lead someone down to a path that's a dead end just as the judge said; they decline to find it. That it was -- it was this allegation and this assumption that his license was permanently denied. It wasn't. It issued as they said. THE COURT: You're adding so much to that statement. MR. MADONIA: I'm reading right from the opinion, Judge.

THE COURT: His opinion is not binding on me. That opinion is meaningless.

MR. MADONIA: But there not only is -- okay. Judge, is there a question. Is there a dispute of fact. We would argue absolutely.

THE COURT: And I've been sitting here for --
MR. MADONIA: Absolutely there are many disputes --
THE COURT: -- almost an hour now saying what fact is in dispute.

MR. MADONIA: The fact is in dispute of whether the
home foreclosure, the bankruptcy, these other elements, these elements of insurance --

THE COURT: No one in there --
MR. MADONIA: -- are criminal matters when they are civil matters.

THE COURT: No one in there says that those are all criminal matters. That statement that his criminal record is --

MR. MADONIA: Well, we would argue that that's another question of fact.

THE COURT: Who would reasonably interpret that to mean that when someone says their home was foreclosed that that is a criminal matter? Who?

MR. DONOHUE: Mr. Sattler who put the thing together. His intent was to have people believe --

THE COURT: No. I'm not asking you what his intent was.

MR. DONOHUE: You asked me who would believe.
THE COURT: He can't -- it's not defamation if he published it to himself. I'm saying what reasonable voter in the Village of Poplar Grove is going to look at that and say, oh, look, he had a criminal foreclosure; oh, look, his insurance license was criminally denied?

MR. MADONIA: Well, the people that canceled that
business, Judge, sure did.
THE COURT: How did --
MR. MADONIA: Because they thought he was convicted of insurance fraud, which is a felony, and he was not. That's the gist of this.

THE COURT: He was disciplined for insurance fraud. He was. It's a verifiably objectively true fact.

MR. DONOHUE: I think the actual statement was because you're under investigation for insurance fraud because after the election there was at least one false report to the insurance commissioner that Owen was --

THE COURT: Who made that?
MR. DONOHUE: We believe it was Mrs. Rodgers.
THE COURT: But you don't know that.
MR. DONOHUE: Well, we'll get it. We're fairly certain. She was a competing agent at Broadmoor Insurance and was consistently --

THE COURT: Yeah. You talk about that in your pleadings.

MR. DONOHUE: Yes. We also talked about it in the affidavit. I'd like to say something about the --

THE COURT: We're at a summary judgment right now. MR. DONOHUE: We are in summary judgment right now.

THE COURT: Where are your facts?
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MR. DONOHUE: The facts are in the --
THE COURT: You have the burden of adducing facts in the face of a motion for summary judgment.

MR. MADONIA: Your Honor --
THE COURT: You can't say we'll do more discovery later.

MR. DONOHUE: I'm not saying that.
MR. MADONIA: Your Honor, we did present the facts in the affidavit and the case law is very clear that says if we present an affidavit -- and they just fail to even respond. What is in that affidavit is deemed to be true. We have good support in the case law for that. They didn't even respond to this. They didn't respond --

THE COURT: But your affidavit -- 90 percent of your affidavit isn't even properly part of an affidavit. You just regurgitate what Judge Barch said.

MR. MADONIA: So that makes that facts that we state in there that are deemed --

THE COURT: No. In a 1-109 affidavit, he can't testify to anything he doesn't have personal knowledge of.

MR. MADONIA: He does have personal knowledge, Judge, as he stated and the fact that they didn't even respond --

THE COURT: You're trying to tell me that quoting a judge's opinion in an affidavit makes it true?

MR. MADONIA: Your Honor, it wasn't simply quoting the judge's --

THE COURT: Over and over and over again you wholesale --

MR. MADONIA: He went there -- he went there with the facts. He stated the affidavit. Under Purtill vs. Hess, defendants have admitted as true all facts averred in the affidavit. They never responded. They never counter -they never contradicted anything in there.

THE COURT: The only facts in that affidavit are that he has never been criminally convicted of insurance fraud.

MR. MADONIA: Which he has not. And again, an arguable issue of fact is what would this be -- what would a jury determine that is the gist -- the nature of this, and I would argue absolutely that this -- that they would think these elements are criminal.

THE COURT: You know, Counsel, under 1-109, an affidavit must contain allegations of fact of which the affiant is personally aware to the best of his knowledge and belief. To quote case law in an affidavit, to quote a judge's opinion at length is not facts of which he is
personally aware. That's what I'm trying to tell you.
The only facts of which he is personally aware in his affidavit are those facts saying I stopped getting calls back from the school district, I lost the Pumilia family business, I have never been criminally convicted of fraud or -- well, I've never been criminally convicted of fraud. Those are facts to which he can swear. That's all I'm trying to say.

MR. MADONIA: In addition, Your Honor, from Paragraph 25 on, that he states the facts of them continuing to go after him and to defame him and to tortiously interfere with him on social media and other postings --

THE COURT: By repeating these same allegations that are in the flyer.

MR. MADONIA: No, no, Judge. These go -- no, Your Honor. In addition to that, he says other things where they called him a habitual criminal and did accuse him of fraud and other acts in addition to the flyer.

THE COURT: Correct me if I'm wrong, but that's based on hearsay. He says someone else told me -- they told him that he has been convicted of fraud or is a habitual criminal.

MR. MADONIA: They're in the post, Judge. They're in
the post, the repeated postings on social media from each of the three defendants.

THE COURT: But you didn't produce any of those.
MR. DONOHUE: Actually I think we did, Judge.
THE COURT: The blog? I read that blog and it's essentially the same stuff that's in the --

MR. DONOHUE: I think there's at least a post from Marion Thornberry that has some personal interpretation of the law that says two misdemeanors equals a felony in Illinois and why is Owen Costanza still in office.

THE COURT: But she's just wrong; right? But that part of it -- to say two misdemeanors equals a felony is a statement of opinion.

MR. DONOHUE: An opinion is not protected anymore.
THE COURT: She doesn't --
MR. DONOHUE: He. Marion Thornberry is a man.
THE COURT: Yeah. But it --
MR. DONOHUE: Also, Judge, this motion only seems to be directed at the defamation counts. There are 13 counts in this --

THE COURT: But the whole thing falls if there's no defamation.

MR. DONOHUE: I don't think so.
THE COURT: If the statements are made -- if the
statements are made and they are true, then it's not tortious interference with a business advantage. It goes away if the statements are true because it's an element of everything you plead.

MR. DONOHUE: Yes, it is. And their intent is to interfere with his career.

THE COURT: As a politician.
MR. DONOHUE: Which is irretrievably intertwined with his -- what he does in the community as an insurance agent with Flanders. This is a character assassination. He sponsors little league teams. He's active in the Lions Club. The Masons refuse to let him join because they said he was under investigation for insurance fraud. Is that correct?

MR. COSTANZA: They said I was under indictment.
MR. DONOHUE: Indictment. They said that Owen was under indictment.

THE COURT: Unless you can prove one of them said that to the Masons, then that's irrelevant.

MR. MADONIA: Well, Judge, we do say and we do allege in the complaint that they went around pretty much to every residence and every business and posted this -handed it to everyone in the community and posted it at each of these businesses. They widely disseminated this.

THE COURT: They did that during the election.
MR. DONOHUE: They continued to do it.
MR. MADONIA: The fact, Your Honor, that they continued to do it -- we did not file anything for him after the election, Your Honor, until well after the election when their actions continued. They weren't satisfied to try to defeat him in an election. They went for this cancel type culture kind of thing to destroy his business and him in the community. That's the gist of what the complaint says. It was their continued actions --

THE COURT: But do you agree --
MR. MADONIA: It is harming him.
THE COURT: Do you agree that if it's true, it doesn't matter?

MR. MADONIA: Judge, I do not -THE COURT: I'm not saying that it is true or not true. I'm not saying that your argument that it has to all be read in context is wrong. I'm just asking the question. If it is true, then all of those other -whether they're continuing to do it, whether it's intentional -- whether it's interference with a prospective business advantage, those all fall by the way side.

MR. DONOHUE: Yes. And truth is an absolute defense of defamation.

MR. MADONIA: Not in certain aspects of defamation per se, Judge. There can be -- there can be truthful statements but here -- the problem here is --

THE COURT: What?
MR. MADONIA: These are not true.
THE COURT: What? I want you to find me a case that says that defamation per se can exist where it's true.

MR. MADONIA: Reckless disregard for the truth or falsity.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then it's not true.
MR. MADONIA: But, Judge, these aren't true. As Judge Barch said is that -- stated in the opinion. When you look at the totality of this as a whole, what you look at is red print "My opponent's criminal record is insurance fraud." That's what it says. He was never ever convicted of insurance fraud. That's the gist I think if we're going to get down to it.

THE COURT: He wasn't convicted -- you keep -- you're hanging your hat on that argument and I'm saying what difference does it make if he was administratively or civilly disciplined or terminated for fraud?

MR. DONOHUE: Because Mr. Sattler characterized it as
a crime and it's not a crime.
THE COURT: But the harm that arises -- the sting that arises out of the defamatory statement is the same.

MR. DONOHUE: No, it's not. You're looking --
THE COURT: He was fired from Liberty Mutual because he committed fraud.

MR. DONOHUE: He was accused of fraud.
THE COURT: By Liberty Mutual and that's why they fired him.
(Simultaneous speaking.)
MR. DONOHUE: Later found no fraud.
THE COURT: No. The Indiana Department of Insurance later let him enter into a consent agreement in a settlement.

MR. DONOHUE: I think there was an internal investigation with Liberty Mutual.

THE COURT: They closed their file as part of a consent agreement. That's what happened in that file because Liberty Mutual were the ones that instituted the complaint.

MR. DONOHUE: Liberty Mutual -- his job was in Illinois. It wasn't in Indiana.

THE COURT: He was working as a producer for Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and they terminated his
relationship because they filed a complaint with the Illinois -- or the Wisconsin Department of Insurance saying he was engaging in fraud and they let the Wisconsin Department of Insurance know we fired him for this so they were, in essence, turning themselves in because one of their agents was in their estimation engaged in fraud.

MR. MADONIA: Judge, the Court determined that that was misleading and false and defamatory.

THE COURT: No, it didn't. I haven't determined that at all.

MR. MADONIA: Well, the earlier -- the earlier judge who I think is --

THE COURT: Well, what if $I$ think he got it wrong?
MR. DONOHUE: Well, then shouldn't this be a motion to reconsider?

MR. MADONIA: Yeah.
THE COURT: No. No. You got to file a motion to reconsider within 30 days.

MR. DONOHUE: On a final judgment.
THE COURT: We started out today by saying this whole thing is under a different standard than a SLAPP Act where you have to find that there is no possible merit, and I could think Judge Barch got it wrong. There's no

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law of the case, there's no appellate opinion. I could just say he got it wrong, he should have dismissed it the first time. I haven't but I could.

This is a motion for summary judgment and I'll just share with counsel. Before I became a judge, I practiced primarily in federal court. In federal court they love motions for summary judgment. In state court not so much and I think you guys probably both know that.

You know, the appellate court if I decide this in favor of the defendants is going to look at this de novo. So if I find there is anything that creates a question of fact that is in dispute -- a material question of fact that is in dispute, I have to deny their motion, you know, and that's one of the reasons I'm pressing you guys so hard is because if there is a question of fact, I need to be able to set it for -- in a manner that is a little more -- a little less amorphous as this distinction between criminal fraud and civil fraud.

MR. MADONIA: Your Honor, if I could say. In doing that -- you know, absolutely that is your task to do that, Judge, but the courts are very clear that it says that the record is to be construed strictly against the movant --

THE COURT: It absolutely does.

MR. MADONIA: -- and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party and that summary judgment should not be allowed unless the moving party's right to judgment is clear from doubt because the plaintiffs are not required to prove their cases at the summary judgment stage.

THE COURT: You're absolutely correct. You are allowed -- you must produce some evidence which creates a material question of fact.

I have been grilling these guys like a bad bear, Mr. -- how often have I done this?

MR. FERGUSON: Ferguson, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yeah, I know.
MR. FERGUSON: Of course.
THE COURT: I don't know why I was going there. I will tell you that the Illinois Supreme Court has said that whether a statement is a factual assertion that could give rise to a defamation claim is a question of law for determination by the Court. That comes from a case called Imperial Apparel and is talking about this idea of privileged statements and the need to show reckless disregard for the truth or maliciousness.

Mr. Ferguson, you know, you've been listening intently. Is there anything that you'd like to say?

MR. FERGUSON: Just to clear the record -- and I
don't know if it matters -- Mr. Costanza continued to be a precinct committeeman, a chairman for the Republican Central Committee, represented himself to be the village president after the election was over.

THE COURT: Wasn't he for at least a short period of time?

MR. FERGUSON: Until maybe a few months ago and maybe it's still going on. He still posts on Costanza Village President so -- and that was talked about last time and it was -- it was considered -- he was still a public figure after the election, if it makes a difference.

THE COURT: Well, and I would think that this litigation is perpetuating this whole thing on both sides I mean in a place like Poplar Grove.

MR. FERGUSON: There is a -- very true. There's a lot going on still. Attendance at meetings. A meeting last night even that occurrences have happened. There's factions and groups.

THE COURT: The pro Costanza and pro Sattler type of groups?

MR. FERGUSON: It's not quite like that but yes. There's been a lot of --

THE COURT: And there is effectively no Democratic party.

MR. FERGUSON: Correct, correct. It's -- I wouldn't say there's a pro Sattler group. More of an anti Sattler group for some reason, but it's all part of the bigger picture.

THE COURT: When's the next election?
MR. FERGUSON: I'm assuming for village president another three and a half years maybe.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Something like that.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Two. Two and a quarter.
MR. FERGUSON: Two and a quarter.
THE COURT: Okay. I should -- I guess now that you say that, years ago -- and this doesn't have anything -I was in federal court defending the Poplar Grove village president for terminating somebody. It was a Section 1983 claim. And at that time the village president was a lawyer who was very politically involved in the republican party. I forget his name. He was the defendant. What was his name?

MR. COSTANZA: Brad Rightnowar.
THE COURT: Yeah, Rightnowar.
MR. COSTANZA: He's actually the one that asked me to run long ago.

THE COURT: What now?
MR. COSTANZA: He's the -- he's the person who asked
me to run for trustee 12 years ago.
THE COURT: Yeah. Brad Rightnowar, yeah. I'm not -is he still in Poplar Grove right now?

MR. COSTANZA: He's in Springfield.
THE COURT: Yeah. He told me he wanted to -- he eventually wants to run for governor or that used to be his ambition.

I'm curious on a more one-to-one scale, is there -- is there any chance of resolution of this by something other than motion or trial?

MR. FERGUSON: I can't imagine -- opposing counsel is more creative than I am, and if we wish to take a chance to do that, I'd be open, of course.

THE COURT: Is there --
MR. DONOHUE: Sure. We'd love to talk to Mr. Ferguson.

MR. MADONIA: I'm a big fan, Judge, of pretrial mediation with Your Honor in an in-chambers session if that's something that you would entertain.

THE COURT: Well, here's what I'm thinking. I'm thinking that I'm going to set a date -- and I'm talking out loud -- and I am going to sit on -- I'm going to get a decision ready because I always need to have one ready to go one way or the other, but then maybe we can proceed

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sometime in the near future and even do it by Zoom without the clients if you'd like. I could be in chambers and we could do it very informally by Zoom because you guys come in from Chicago?

MR. DONOHUE: Barrington and Chicago.
MR. MADONIA: Chicago.
MR. DONOHUE: I'm in Lake in the Hills so I'm not that far away. I'm in McHenry County.

THE COURT: Okay. But do a -- you know, a pretrial conference, a settlement conference, whatever you want to call it. And it strikes me that, you know, if there's ever going to be a chance to settle, it's going to have to be sooner than later because attorneys' fees come into play, if they haven't already.

But, you know, then you and Mr. Ferguson are going to have to chat. Mr. Ferguson my guess is is being employed by some sort of risk management association and those guys generally only know how to talk about money.

Are you guys working the week -- and this is for all three of you -- the week between -- well, the 26th is a court holiday of December. The 27, 28, 29 and 30 I'll be here and I would have time to have a pretrial conference with you guys either the 29th in the afternoon or the 30 th in the afternoon.

MR. DONOHUE: I'm not going anywhere, Judge.
MR. FERGUSON: The 29th would be good.
MR. MADONIA: Yeah. The sooner the better, Judge.
MR. DONOHUE: The 29th is the consensus, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. Normally I would ask for position statements, but I think I got a pretty good handle on what the relative positions are. I would, though, if, you know -- if you would like to send me a confidential -- in other words, you don't show each other, but a confidential statement about potential settlement -- and I won't disclose either parties' position without consent or permission. Right? It would help me to know what your guys' we'll say -- and I know you won't give me your floor, but what your floor for purposes of mediation is and what your ceiling for purposes of mediation is because it's not necessarily going to be money. As a matter of fact, I would assume there's going to have to be some sort of nondisparagement agreement on a going-forward basis from his point of view.

MR. FERGUSON: Right. Poplar Grove being what it is --

THE COURT: Yeah, I know. How do you ever enforce something like that.

MR. FERGUSON: Yeah. And if there's going to be continued involvement -- if this was a one time thing, absolutely, or if this was nonpolitical, absolutely, but I don't see how that would -- to put it out there. I don't want any surprises at this pretrial. I don't see how that would ever work.

THE COURT: I understand. I understand, but let's give it a shot.

MR. MADONIA: Your Honor, if I could say being the eternal optimist, I think that I've found life is better without stress, without tension, without arguing, especially when the argument, at least from some people's standpoint, crosses the line. I think it's better that we do try to advocate civility between the parties and nondisparagement --

THE COURT: And the parties are all here except for Cheryl, who's not really a party anymore.

MR. DONOHUE: Yeah. We dismissed her.
THE COURT: Oh, she is here.
Hi.
Her I know but that's because she practices in front of me.

MR. DONOHUE: I understand.
THE COURT: Right now I'm pretty sure both sides of
this deal are for the most part walking around on eggshells and Poplar Grove not only includes that little village, but there's a big residential area out there called Candlewick Lake, right, and it's indescribable. Candlewick Lake is kind of an entity unto itself and it's just -- it is. Okay? And I think that something like this for these folks to hear what you all are saying and what I'm saying is in and of itself a little bit helpful. I would hope, you know, because now they I think probably understand that you got to be careful or you end up talking to somebody like me. And they already lost -- well, lost -- but they essentially lost once in front of Judge Barch, you know, and I haven't made a decision today and that's why I wanted to explain at the end why I'm being so tough on you is because I want to make sure whatever I decide I don't get it wrong. I mean, I don't mind being appealed. I don't mind being reversed, but I want to make sure I'm doing what I think is right. So, yeah, I'm kind of optimistic about at least using this as an opportunity to air it out.

So we'll say 1:30 on the 29th of December we will have a pretrial conference. I'm going to take the motion for summary judgment under advisement and I will hold my
decision in abeyance until we've had the pretrial conference. And after the -- at the end of the pretrial conference, the settlement conference, we will set a new date -- a future date and I will then issue my decision.

And I would ask that the parties send me a confidential statement. I will not disclose to the other side any part of your confidential statement without your consent, but just so I can get a handle on where you both are, it would be great if I had that -- you know what, if I had it by Tuesday the 27th, all right, because I'm not going to look at it before then anyway.

MR. DONOHUE: Obviously this is a confidential statement. We can just deliver it to Your Honor.

THE COURT: Here's what we're going to do. I love e-mail. Send it to me as a PDF or in the body of an e-mail. My e-mail address is my name --

Is my name plaque up there?
S. Balogh. Rhymes with halo. There is no U in my last name. If there was, you'd pronounce it correctly. So it's SBalogh@17thcircuit.Illinoiscourts.gov, and if you lose that, you can get it from the clerk's office. And my -- the Zoom number for the conference -- my Zoom number is static. It's 96397918024. All right?

And as I said, I'll be in chambers. You're
welcome to appear by Zoom. I guess we should settle this right now. Would you prefer that it be virtual?

MR. FERGUSON: I prefer in person, but I understand the distance so I'm going to defer.

MR. MADONIA: Yeah. I think that given the holiday, I may be out of town. Zoom would be better for me if that works.

THE COURT: Virtual it is. Okay. And we have somebody named John Kraft watching us. Is that one of the defendants -- no.

MR. FERGUSON: No.
MR. DONOHUE: I think he's a journalist.
THE COURT: Ah. Okay. Any questions? Anything else anybody wants to say?

MR. DONOHUE: The 2-615 would be taken under advisement with the motion for summary judgment?

THE COURT: Yeah. And I shouldn't lose track of that. Yes, absolutely. I'm looking at both motions, and, in fact, we did discuss the 2-615 this morning because of that reasonable expectation -- or this afternoon, excuse me, and, yes, I am considering that and, you know, you saw me looking at it several times. What I have up here is a stack of case law, copies of all your briefs and something -- I know how to type so I make

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notes on the computer. Okay? And then ultimately I can end up using those notes for a decision if I need to.

All right.
MR. FERGUSON: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Thank you, everybody. Good luck to you. Let's play nice until we -- well, let's just play nice just because it's the right thing to do.

MR. DONOHUE: I think Mr. Ferguson and we have played nice since day one.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sure you have. And I've known -I've known Mr. Ferguson for less time, but I've known his father forever, 35 years.

Good luck, everybody. Thank you very much. (End of proceedings.)

SIAIE OF ILLINOIS
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT BOONE COUNTY
for the Circuit Court of Boone County, 17th Judicial Circuit of Illinois, transcribed the electronic recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause to the best of my ability and based on the quality of the recording, and I hereby certify the foregoing to be a true and accurate transcript of the said electronic recording.
$\qquad$
Wichele Fitch
Official Court Reporter

Dated this 21st day of March, 2023.

