THE COURT: We are back on the record. indicated a moment ago, the hearing on a petition such as this is to be heard within thirty days, and the Court is to rule promptly after the hearing, and that is what the Court is prepared to do at this time. It's also clear, I think everyone is in agreement, that the, this Court's review of the Bloomington Municipal Officer's Electoral, Electoral Board is confined to the record that has been filed, and it was filed here on December twentieth by the Electoral Board. One of the first questions that the Court has to decide is what is this Court's standard of review, and the parties have suggested different opposing standards of review. Ιf there's a question of fact and the standard is whether the findings of the board are against the manifest weight of the evidence, if the Court is considering questions of law, then the board's decision is reviewed de novo, but if it's a mixed question of law and fact, then I have to decide whether the board's decision was clearly erroneous. Mr. Koetters has suggested that the Court use that standard, and Mr. Mueller in his papers, I think, has suggested that the Court use the question of law standard, the de novo standard, and it's -- the cases seem to go both ways on this, but the, the Cinkus

case that we've been referring to quite a bit here today—that was an 08 Illinois Supreme Court case — and they did hold that an examination of the legal effect of a given state of facts involves a mixed question of law and facts, so that the standard of review is clearly erroneous, and the definition of clearly erroneous is when the reviewing Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, so that will be the standard that this Court will use in its ruling here today.

First of all, regarding the, the due process arguments that have been put forth here today, Miss McDade argues that the hearing held before the board violated her, her right to due process under the Illinois and the United States Constitution, and Mr. Koetters has argued that if there were any violations, and they were not objected to at the hearing, and therefore, they are procedurally defaulted or, or waived, is another word for that. The Court does find that the due process arguments made here today by Mr. Mueller and Mr. Countryman are not procedurally defaulted as the board did fail to adopt any rules of procedure as required clearly by Section 1010 of the Election Code. Now, it is true that the proposed rules

were sent out on Friday, but they were never adopted by the board, and additionally, Miss McDade did object to them in a written response, and it's true that she didn't make another oral objection at the time, but those rules were never adopted as required under Section 1010. And as Mr. Mueller pointed out a little while ago, there was a decision to, to sustain Mr. Koetter's objection as to evidence of other petitions that had been filed by other candidates for mayor and city council, and, and there was a decision that, that that was not relevant, but as Mr. Mueller pointed out, what was that based upon? There were no rules that had been adopted to, to make, to make those findings.

And so therefore, the Court does find that there were due process violations that have not been waived, including violation of the Open Meetings Act. Since the board is a, a quasi adjudicated body, they are required to comply with the Open Meetings Act. On the other hand, Electoral Boards are specifically set apart in the act, is not excluded from the act, and so under that Powell case, which gives this Court authority to, to find the results of a violation of an Open Meetings Act null and void, that this Court will do that today, including the failure to take a vote in open session,

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the failure to close the meeting in violation of the act, having no record of the closed session, failing to post a notice of the meeting, failing to set an agenda. The Court does not find that allowing Mr. Peterson to be present was a violation, but it does for those other reasons.

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Miss McDade has also argued that there was a due process violation in that the findings of the board's written decision were not sufficient, however, I agree with Mr. Day that Section 1010 only says that it must state its findings, and the Court does find that it did that, but that the meeting itself was in violation of the Open Meetings Act, and for that reason, the Court will find the results null and void. Additionally, even if all of the due process arguments were waived, the Court in its discretion can review issues that otherwise might be waived according to this Cinkus case, and that is what this Court will do and find that her due process rights were violated. Now, even if the Court found that there were no due process violations, or if the Court found that all of those violations were procedurally defaulted, the Court also agrees with Miss McDade's argument that the board's decision regarding the office of Alderman argument and the date of election decisions

are also clearly erroneous, although they are certainly much closer calls, and certainly Mr., Mr. Koetters has made arguments -- both sides have made excellent arguments on the issues -- but the Court does find that once again those decisions were clearly erroneous.

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According to that Lewis versus Dunn case, which is the 1976 Illinois Supreme Court case, in determining whether a candidate substantially complies with the Election Code requirements, that are two requirements, number one, that the nominating papers as a whole must not create a basis for confusion as to the office sought, and Mr. Koetters is correct, it's not was there actual confusion, but would it create a basis for the confusion. Number two, the purpose of the nominating papers that contains the incorrect office must not have been frustrated because of the errors. Now, because Miss McDade argues all of the cases cited by Mr. Koetters do have a common theme of confusion, there were multiple vacancies and different terms, and, one, no office was even listed at all, and so that is a different situation than what we have here. Here, the only thing that can be argued as far as confusion is that the petitions state Alderman, but on all of the other papers, it does state Alderman Fifth Ward. There

was only one Alderman to be elected from the Fifth Ward in the upcoming election. It is true that there were other wards that were electing Aldermen, but it is clear from the address on the petitions, that Miss McDade was a resident of the Fifth Ward, and so for those reasons, the Court finds that the nominating papers as a whole did not create a basis for confusion as to the office sought, and once again, that the board's decision is clearly erroneous.

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As to the date of the election, there's a couple of issues once again involved there. The board found that omitting Ward Five was not in substantial compliance, but only found that the date issue to be defective, so I -- I think I agree with Mr. Mueller, that it is unclear if they also found the date not to be in substantial compliance, and so the Court finds that the only issue that the board found to have not been in substantial compliance was the Alderman Ward Five issue and not really the date, and so the Court doesn't even feel that it's necessary to address that issue, but I will anyway. Miss McDade raises the question as to whether a petition under Article Ten instead of Article Seven, that Mr. Koetters had suggested, even requires an election date. That's certainly an issue. It doesn't

set forth that in the, in the actual statute, but as Mr. Koetters pointed out, there's a form that does contain the date. As Mr. Mueller has then pointed out, well, that was just for a new political party, so it is unclear if even a date is required in this election, but assuming there was a date required, the date that was used, April the 9th of 2013, is and will be the date of the election. It was possible that there could have been a primary election on February 26th, 2013, but there will not be one now. The actual date of the election will be April the 9th, 2013. The case cited by Mr. Koetters, the Girot case, the G-I-R-O-T case, in that case, there was a wrong date used, and, and an Electoral Board throughout those petitions, but as Mr. Mueller had mentioned, the case was then decided on other issues dealing with the issue of -- there's a conflict of interest as I recall, and then the failure to staple or attach the documents -- and so the Appellate Court never had an, a chance to deal with that issue, and the Supreme Court reversed on other issues as well, so that issue never came up except at the board level.

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And so for those reasons, the Court does find that Miss McDade has substantially complied with

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the Election Code regarding the date issue as well, and that their decision calling the date defective, which I don't think is proper, but even if that was considered to be a finding of not substantial compliance, the Court feels that their decision once again was clearly erroneous. And so for those reasons, the Court will enter an order reversing the decision of the board, order that Jennifer McDade be placed on the ballot as a Candidate for Alderman of the Fifth Ward at the consolidated election for the Bloomington, Illinois City Council on April 9th, 2013. And once again, I appreciate the briefings made by all the parties. were excellent and assisted the Court very much in its decision, and I thank all of you for that. Mr. Mueller, if you could put together an order, the Court would go ahead and enter it.

MR. MUELLER: I would be glad to. I'd ask if the Court Reporter would type up your ruling, and, because I'd like to attach it as an exhibit to the order, but I will, I will -- I will draft up an order, and as soon as she has that, she can let me know, and we'll get copies to everyone and get one to you.

THE COURT: All right. Is that agreeable?

MR. KOETTERS: Yes, Your Honor.

1	MR. MUELLER: Do we need to do that just
2	informally, or do you want to set a time to enter the
3	order?
4	MR. KOETTERS: I don't think formal is
5	needed.
6	THE COURT: Just whenever you can get it to
7	me. Thanks everybody.
8	MR. MUELLER: Thanks very much, judge.
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10	(WHICH WERE ALL MATTERS HEARD AND RECEIVED IN THE
11	HEARING OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE.)
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